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A national bankruptcy is by no means 
illegal, and whether it is immoral or unwise 
depends altogether upon circumstances. One 
can hardly ask of the present generation that 
it alone shall suffer for the folly and waste 
of its predecessors, for otherwise in the end 
a country could hardly be inhabited because 
of the mass of its public debts. 
Hugo, Lehrbuch des Naturrechts, (2nd ed. Berlin, 
1819), quoted from Edwin Borchard (1951), 




The Latin American debt crisis of the 1980's has regenerated 
academic interest in the widespread bond defaults of the 1930's, 
an experience that feems to parallel recent events. The decade 
preceding each crisis witnessed a significant increase in lending 
to developing countries and to Latin America in particular. 
Repayment difficulties were widespread and tri9'gered mainly by 
external shocks, including sudden shifts in commodity prices and 
real interest rates and slump-induced reductions in demand by 
industrialized countries for developing countries' exports. 
There were ex post accusations of myopic behavior by 
international bankers, notably of a relaxation in credit 
standards, characterized by overly aggressive bond marketing in 
the 1920's or loan-pushing in the 1970's. When sovereign 
borrowers reneged on their loan contracts, creditors faced the 
expensive and time-consuming process of renegotiation. 
The differences between these two eras are just as striking. 
The institutional arrangements of today's capital markets are far 
more sophisticated than in the 1920' s as are the macroeconomic 
policy tools utilized by governments in the pursuit of stability. 
The existence of the International Monetary Fund as a referee for 
the extension of new credit is especially important in creating a 
cooperative environment for avoiding outright default. In 
addition, the legal consequences of sovereign default have become 
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more harsh since the 1930's.1 Furthermore, private-sector 
lending to sovereign entities today consists almost exclusively 
of syndicated bank loans instead of publicly-floated bonds. For 
bondholders, debt moratorium simply means a capital loss. For 
the money-center banks, default on sovereign debt could mean 
failure, with unpredictable consequences on the international 
economy. Such default, however, may well be less likely than a 
bond default since potential defaults are more easily rescheduled 
with fewer creditors at the negotiating table. The difficulty in 
resolving interwar defaults was a reflection of the myriad of 
bondholders whose consent was required. Nevertheless, it was 
this very same dispersion that allowed final settlements to 
include partial debt forgiveness. Therefore, as an illustration 
of the process and consequences of negotiation and settlement, 
albeit in different institutional and legal environments, the 
interwar defaults of Latin America remain of great interest. 
Historical parallels reach back much further than the 
1930's. As one of us has written earlier, before the current 
debt crisis broke out: 
The history of international capital movements since at 
least the early nineteenth century is characterized by 
large-scale borrowing of developing regions, and large-
scale defaults. Many of the same debates over 
prudential standards, government guarantees of foreign 
loans, rescheduling of debt, and so forth have been 
1 The sanctions that private creditors can impose on 
defaulting countries have increased significantly through changes 
in international law since 1945. Although these legal remedies 
have not been called upon in the current crisis, they may well 
serve as another incentive for sovereign borrowers to avoid 
outright default. See Lewis Alexander (1987). 
pursued for one-hundred-titty years. And even many ot 
the actors remain the same. A number of Latin American 
countries that are still among the most problematic for 
foreign loans first entered the London bond market upon 
independence in 1822-1825, and defaulted soon after, 
setting in train a hundred years of alternating 
solvency and default. 2 
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Intermittent bond defaults were a normal cyclical occurrence 
for Latin America by the late nineteenth century. As a rule, 
they were rapidly followed by settlement so that parties on both 
sides could get back to the business of shifting capital from 
Europe,especially Britain, to the periphery. 3, Because these 
default settlements involved the forced rewriting of loan 
contracts, some modern observers have suggested that they are 
directly comparable to today's multilateral reschedulings. 4 
However, such a characterization obscures an essential component 
of the nineteenth century bond settlements -- substantial debt 
forgiveness. 
In contrast to the nineteenth century pattern, the defaults 
and subsequent negotiations of the interwar period were greatly 
disruptive to capital inflows to Latin America, with some bonds 
evading permanent settlement for decades. The general impression 
is that penal ties for choosing to default in the 1930 I S were 
severe. Access to credit was, indeed, limited for decades 
following the numerous defaults, and capital flows of equivalent 
2 Sachs (1982), p. 219. 
3 See Fishlow (1985) for an excellent history of 19th 
century lending. 
4 Nordhaus referred to rescheduling as "partial default 
under another name". Nordhaus (1986), p. 564. 
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magnitude to those _of the 1920' s did not reappear until the 
1970's. However, the aftermath of these bond defaults is not 
well understood. One question is whether exclusion from 
international borrowing was a consciously-imposed penalty of 
default or whether the general breakdown of international capital 
markets accompanying (and somewhat preceding) the defaults of the 
Depression era, followed by the turmoil of World War II and the 
emergence of new international financial institutions, created 
this inter~ational capital immobility without discrimination. In 
an attempt to discover the existence and harshness of penalty 
imposed on interwar borrowers in Latin American, it seems 
sensible to start by comparing outcomes for defaulters to those 
for non-defaulters. 
This paper adds to recent investigations of the realized 
cost of foreign capital to individual sovereign borrowers 5 in 
Latin America and assesses the impact on that cost of choosing to 
default or not to default in the 1930's. A central emphasis of 
this analysis is the calculation of the extent of debt 
forgiveness implicit in the sequence of debt moratorium, 
anonymous buyback of debt at deep discounts, and eventual 
renegotiation of the bond contracts. Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, 
Colombia, and Peru were selected as illustrative examples of 
borrowing behavior. Argentina was one of the few Latin American 
5 See Eichengreen and Portes (1986), Eichengreen (1987) I 
and Lindert and Morton (1987) for independent investigations of 
many of these questions, using different samples of countries but 
generally reaching the same conclusions. 
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countries in the 1930 's .... hich maintained full servicing on its 
national debt; the other four countries mentioned joined the 
burgeoning ranks of sovereign defaulter~. 
By calculating the net present value of the stream of income 
and repayments on the dollar-denominated external government 
bonds of these countries, .... e show that defaulters and non-
defaulters in Latin America had very different rates of loan 
repayment in present value terms. Argentina, the sole non-
defaulter in our study, made substantially larger loan repayments 
in present value terms, but was not" rewarded by easier cr-edi t 
access in the postwar period. Furthermore, it appears that 
interwar defaults, like those of the nineteenth century, resulted 
in eventual settlements of a concessionary nature which we would 
characterize as new contracts written to share the burden of the 
unforeseen contingency that led to default. 
Debt relief in present value terms came in three forms: 
firstly, the debtors anonymously repurchased bonds at deep 
discounts during default; secondly, the final settlements 
extended maturities and lowered interest rates; and, thirdly, 
unpaid interest was never capital ized. However, principal was 
not cancelled for any of the countries of this study. This kind 
of relief may well be mutually beneficial to creditors and 
debtors. 6 Default did not mean that the countries paid nothing. 
Many offered partial payments even during default, and after 
6 See Sachs and Huizinga (1987) for the argument that 
relief can be mutually beneficial in today's setting. 
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settlement, the countries resumed payment on a sUbstantial scale. 
The defaulting countries repaid far less than full present value 
on their loans but far more than zero. 
The next part of this paper provides some descriptive 
background on interwar lending to Latin America. The third 
section discusses the subsequent defaults of the 1930' s, the 
extent of buybacks of debt on the open market at deep discounts, 
and the terms under which final settlements were reached in the 
following decades. The fourth section presents results on the 
actual payments made by four Latin American defaulters and one 
non-defaulter over the lifetime of the relevant loans. The 
present value of receipts and payments by the country on its 
national and nationally-guaranteed dollar bonds and the ratio of 
the present values of payments to principal provide alternative 
measures of the effective cost of lending from the creditor's 
point of view and indicate the ex post borrowing terms available 
to the Latin American states. The fifth section explores the 
longer term repercussions 
external finance to these 
of default, examining the flows of 
countries in the 1950's and early 
1960's when penalties of restricted credit access against 
defaulters might have been enforced. The final section provides 
a summary of results and conclusions of relevance to the Latin 
American debt crisis of the 1980's. 
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2. Lending in the Interwar Period 
Foreign lending to Latin America has a long history as 
predominantly private funds have been repeatedly channelled into 
the region in the forms of loans to governments or private 
enterprise, as well as equity capital. Each episode of 
SUbstantial capital inflow has displayed a distinctive character 
but all have included some signs of failure of capital markets, 
the details of which bear lessons for present experience. The 
wave of lending through the nineteenth century to the newly-
independent Latin American states, mostly by Britain, exhibited a 
recurring pattern of lending, default, and settlement, with only 
moderate financial repercussions on the defaulters and, for the 
latter part of the period, no extended exclusion from 
international capital flows. 7 
The far shorter and more dramatic period of lending between 
the world wars witnessed the rise of New York as the dominant 
financial center and an acceleration of loans to governments in 
Latin America. Although the value of Latin America's gross 
external obligations never matched that of North America, Asia or 
Continental Europe, its debt was highly concentrated in a few 
countries, especially Argentina and Brazil. Furthermore, Latin 
America accounted for up to one quarter of new capital issues 
floated in the united states by foreign entities in the 1920's, 
borrowing over $2 billion in bonds on the New York market as well 
7 Again, see Fishlow (1985). 
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as accounting for almost hal f of American direct investment. 8 
When the general speculative surge in financial markets collapsed 
in 1929, Latin American borrowers were pushed into widespread 
default as the world economy tumbled into depression. However, 
it should be remembered that in contrast to Latin American 
repayment difficulties of the 1980's, Latin American defaults in 
the interwar period were but a footnote to defaults by larger 
European borrowers and the breakdown of international markets. 
World War I marks a significant break in the previous 
pattern of international finance. The united states emerged-as a 
net creditor while Britain's lending subsided in response to its 
declining savings rate. The overall level of international 
capital flows, however, never recovered to that of its heyday in 
the period 1870 to 1914; flows of real private investment between 
1914 and 1930 were only two-thirds as great as between 1900 and 
1913. 9 Furthermore, during the interwar period, developmental 
finance for the periphery was overshadowed by lending between the 
industrialized countries for reconstruction and servicing of war 
debts. 
The lending of the interwar period, primarily in the 1920's, 
created a new pattern of large capital flows going to sovereign 
debtors (rather than to the private foreign debtors more 
important in nineteenth century lending). The new central actor, 
the United States, responding to the relatively long and 
8 
9 
Madden, Nadler, and Sauvain (1937), pp. 73-4. 
Fishlow (1985), p. 390. 
9 
detaul tless boom period ot the 1920' 5, provided rapidly rising 
tlows to Latin America, peaking in 1927 and 1928, then dropping 
off in 1929 as U.S. domestic asset returns peaked, declining 
sharply as a result of the 1929 stock market crash, and trailing 
off to zero by 1931. 
After the end of World War I, the u.S. had stepped up its 
investment flows to Latin America in response to improved 
economic opportunities. Some Latin American countries had used 
wa!time semi-autarky as a chance to expand industrialization. As 
export prices rose after the war, the borrowers' debt servicing-
capacity improved. Both the Latin American governments and u.s. 
investors were eager for foreign investment. Between 1914 and 
1919, U. S. investment in Latin America increased by hal f, and 
over the next decade, 1919 to 1929, it doubled from its 1919 
level. 10 Between 1925 and 1929, net long-run capital flow from 
the United States was $200 million per year on average. In real 
terms, this flow to Latin America probably exceeded the previous 
levels reached by British capital in the decade preceding World 
War I, although it should be noted that American lending was a 
far smaller share of the u.s. 's current account surplus1l and of 
its income l2 than Britain's in the half century before World War 
1. 13 
10 United Nations (1955) , p. 14. 
11 Ashworth (1952), p. 196. 
12 Fishlow (1985) , p. 384. 
13 United Nations (1955), p. 15. 
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The principal borrowers in the early 1920's were the 
national governments of the stronger countries such as Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, and Cuba. As the boom ~n public borrowing in the 
New York bond market grew over the course of the decade, riskier 
countries and numerous political subdivisions provinces, 
departments, and municipalities -- also found it possible to sell 
their bonds to American investors. 14 Between 1920 and 1929, 
foreign dollar bonds issued by Latin American countries totalled 
$2.2 billion of which $1.3 billion was owed by national 
governments. 1S However, flotation of securities remained 
primarily a South American phenomenon (with the exception of 
Cuba) . Venezuela bucked the trend and chose instead to retire 
all external debt with the aid of petroleum royalties while 
Mexico and Ecuador were unable to float bonds, suffering from 
impaired credit standings arising from recent and unsettled 
defaults. Fourteen Latin American countries did issue dollar 
bonds by the end of the decade. 
These capital flows were equally significant from the 
perspective of the foreign lending operations of the New York 
market. 16 Between 1924 and 1928, Latin American security issues 
14 Hadden, Nadler, and Sauvain (1937), p. 74. 
15 From United Nations (1955), p. 15, and Foreign 
Bondholders Protective Council (1934), pp. 102-8, 145-51. For 
amounts issued by the five Latin American states in this study, 
see the detailed debt histories in Appendix B. 
16 It should be noted that overseas investment was never as 
large a share of the capital market in the U.S. as in Britain. 
In the 1920's, foreign security issues averaged just 14\ of all 
issues in the U.s., hitting a maximum of 1St in 1927, then 
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constituted 24' of all new foreign bonds in the U.S. market. In 
addition, 44' of all direct investment between 1925 and 1929 went 
to Latin America. Meanwhile, other len~ers had shifted away from 
the region. Britain continued to accept new flotations in 
London, mainly to ~inance railroads, in the amount of £132 
million ($650 million) between 1924 and 1930, but this gross flow 
was offset by large amortizations of old bonds and the sale of 
assets to Latin American nationals. 17 By the end of the decade, 
Britain and the United States, the two major foreign investors, 
had together accumulated a stock of investment claims of all 
types equivalent to four times the value of exports for Latin 
America as a whole while the ratio of long-term external public 
debt to exports stood at 1.49. 18 This level of debt burden was 
not to be reached again until the 1970's but in recent years has 
been far surpassed. The changing pattern of debt burdens from 
1920 to 1945 can be observed in the debt ratios of Table 1. What 
is most striking is the relatively modest size by today's 
falling to 7\ in 1929. From Fishlow (1985), p. 424. 
17 United Nations (1955), pp. 14,18. Fishlow (1985), p. 
419, quotes a conflicting figure of only £51 million in new 
capital issues in London for the entire 1920 to 1931 period. 
18 The ratio of the stock of all British and U.S. 






From Diaz-Alejandro (1983), p. 26-27. 
Table 1. FOREIGN DEBT STOCKS AND DEBT BURDENS: 
1920 TO 1945 (in millions of US$) 
Exports Total public Dollar bond Dollar bond 
debt stock stock interest 
Debt Bond Interest 
ratio ratio ratio 
(in ') (in .) (in ') 
1920 
Argentina 1013 247 24 0 0 0 0 
Bolivia 50 4 8 2 4 0 0 
Chile 289 137 48 0 0 0 0 
Colombia 69 24 35 0 0 0 0 
Peru 172 14 8 0 o _ 0 0 
1925 
Argentina 793 382 48 144 18 6 1 
Bolivia 41 32 79 29 70 2 6 
Chile 229 152 66 38 17 3 1 
Colombia 83 17 21 0 0 0 0 
Peru 87 30 34 0 0 0 0 
1930 
Argentina 875 402 46 273 31 17 2 
Bolivia 26 62 237 59 226 4 17 
Chile 277 334 121 264 95 16 6 
Colombia 172 75 44 72 42 4 3 
Peru 139 106 76 90 65 6 4 
1935 
Argentina 501 420 84 237 47 15 3 
Bollvia 36 62 172 59 166 4 12 
Chile 96 329 343 243 254 15 16 
Colombia 70 81 116 65 93 4 6 
Peru 75 99 131 83 110 5 7 
1940 
Argentina 428 354 83 147 34 6 1 
Bolivia 49 61 123 59 120 4 9 
ChUe 140 288 206 157 112 10 7 
Colombia n 75 106 53 74 3 4 
Peru 65 97 150 83 127 5 8 
1945 
Argentina 682 159 23 124 18 3 0 
Bolivia 80 61 75 59 74 4 5 
Chile 205 320 156 140 68 9 4 
Colombia 141 87 61 53 37 2 1 
Peru 104 96 93 83 80 5 5 
Not.s: 
Exports are current value of goods and services, including gold for 
Bolivia and Chile. 
R.tios are of debt or interest to exports. 
Total public debt stock is generally all foreign obligations of the 
national government, sometimes including short-term debts: 
1920 value for Co_~mbia is actually 1922; 
1935 values are actually 1936 value for Bolivia and 1937 for 
Colombia and Peru; 
1945 values for Bolivia and Colombia are actually 1944; 
Colombia 1935, 1940, and 1945 include interest certificates issued 
lieu of interest payments for some obligations; 1945 includes so 
non-guaranteed corporate bank bonds taken over by the government 
in 1942. 
Argentina 1940 reflects the redemption of $81 million of dollar de 
in 1936-37, matched by an $87 million increase in domestic debt; 
Also in 1945-46, $140 million of dollar debt was redeemed, finan 
out of reserves and new domestic debt. 
Conversion of debt from NCU to $ using exchange rates in UNPD: 
Argentina: end-of-year rates; 
Bolivia: actual conversion rate; 
Colombia: for 1920-35, parity rates; for 1940-45, parity rates fo 
bearer bonds and end-of-year rates for other obligations; 
Chile: parity rates; 
Peru: parity rates. 
Dollar bond stock is nationally-guaranteed issues only. 
Dollar bond interest is contractual interest owed on outstanding dollar 
bonds. 
Sources: 
Exports for 1920-25 from SNP, 1930-45 from SALA v. 20. 
Total debt stock from UNPD. 
Dollar bond stock from authors' estimates. 
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standards of both debt stock and debt servicing to exports 
throughout the period. 
During this decade, capital markets became increasingly 
accessible and generous to Latin American borrowers as the United 
States, and Britain to a lesser extent, provided substantial 
long-term funds. As overseas issues crowded the New York market, 
the issuing houses set up extensive branch networks which 
successfully marketed the bonds to individual investors, eager 
for the large premiums they offered over domestic returns. The 
investment climate seemed much - improved over the past., claimed 
Madden, Nadler, and Sauvain in their 1937 review of America's 
overseas lending. During previous lending episodes, foreign bond 
defaults had been numerous and direct investment often generated 
tension. In the 1920's, virtually no defaults occurred on the 
over 800 foreign bonds issued in the U. S. nor on non-American 
lending. 
As long as the capital markets of the world were 
willing to absorb new foreign issues and debtors could 
continue to borrow, there was no transfer problem, and 
hence no occasion for suspending external debt 
service. 19 
After the fact of widespread default on these loans, the 
U.S. Senate inquiry committee of 1932, as well as many 
contemporary observers, blamed excessive enthusiasm by the 
American investment houses and accused them of violating the 
principles of business ethics, utilizing such selling methods as 
permanently-stationed overseas representatives, deceptive 
19 Madden, Nadler, and Sauvain (1937), p. 108. 
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prospectuses, and bribery of foreign government officials. 
Fishlow (1985) believes the real blame lies with a combination of 
the speculative surge occurring in all U.S. asset markets and the 
strong competition for overseas loans that New York faced from 
London, reflected in falling commissions and risk premia as the 
1920's progressed. 20 Mintz (1951) adds that bond quality 
deteriorated over the three successively higher waves of 
financial activity of 1921 to 1929 (as measured ex post by rates 
of default) but investor confidence grew. The long absence of 
default encouraged an illusion of safety and ever more optimistic 
projections by bankers whose techniques of risk analysis were 
understandably unable to predict a crash. 
The average yield to maturity on Latin America's dollar bond 
issues ranged from 8% in 1921 to 6.3% in 1928, consistently above 
the yield on u.s. high-grade corporate bonds. In addition, the 
borrowers paid an average of 4% bankers' commission on top of an 
average initial sale discount of 3%.21 For the five countries of 
this study, the average yield at time of issue on national and 
nationally-guaranteed bonds during the 1920' s ranged from 6.2% 
for Argentina to 7.6% for Bolivia. 22 The annual average for the 
five countries together varied from 8 to 99 basis points above 
the u.s. low-grade (Baa) corporate rate (except for in 1923 and 
1924 when only Argentina issued bonds and at rates 99 and 47 




Fishlow (1985), p. 423. 
united Nations (1955), p. 16. 
See Table 6. 
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premia paid by these borrowers did not fall significantly through 
the decade. In fact, premia over the U.S. Baa rate of yields at 
date of issue rose up to 1927, then f~ll slightly from 1927 to 
1930 as lending slackened. This pattern is most dramatic for 
Argentina whose premium rose from 99 basis points below the Baa 
rate in 1923 to 60 points above in 1927. Only Colombia, 
borrowing in 1926 to 1928, maintained decreasing premia over all 
years (from 172 to 116 to 91 extra points). 
The rising amounts of sovereign debt claims, a higher 
proportion of which were short-term and all of which were issued 
at higher interest rates than pre-war loans, left the borrowing 
countries heavily dependent on revolving credit and the 
continuous rollover of debt. The international capital market 
improved over the course of the 1920's in its ability to funnel 
investment funds from creditor countries to debtors, but even at 
the time, there were signs of the precariousness of existing 
international financial arrangements as compared to those pre-
war. The high average rates charged on overseas loans required 
equivalent returns on actual use of the funds and eventual higher 
export growth to enable repayment. 
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3. pefault Experience and the Terms of Final Agreements 
The business recession beginning jn 1929 severely undercut 
the ability of foreign debtors to provide funds for debt service 
in their own currency and to transfer those funds into the 
currencies of their creditors. Both budget and balance-of-
payments difficulties arose as export prices as well as volumes 
began to fall and as the joint effects of protection, depression, 
and_the closing of intern~tional capi~al market~ devastated both 
trade and government revenues (most of which were trade-related 
taxes such as import duties). The 25\ fall in the U. S. price 
level between 1928 and 1932 was accompanied by a fall in world 
commodity pr ":'ces which pushed up the cost of debt servicing in 
real terms. The 3 0 to 40\ fall in the prices of coffee, of 
petroleum, of wheat, and of tin, created serious difficulties for 
Colombia, for Colombia and Peru, for Argentina, and for Bolivia 
respectively. 22 Ratios of public debt service to exports rose 
22 Lewis (1938), p. 389. 
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dramatically for all of these countries in the first few years of 
the 1930's.23 
More importantly, the collapse o~ international financial 
markets eliminated the normal rollover of debt so that debt 
service obligations exceeded the value of new lending and net 
capital began to flow out of the region. In addition, during the 
active lending of the 1920's, many debtor countries came to rely 
on new external loans to provide foreign exchange to enable them 
to meet their foreign currency interest payments, supplementing 
that acquired through export trade. 24 The "cross-over point" of 
annual payment obligations surpassing new investment flows was 
reached before defaults occurred and so cannot be interpreted 
simply as a reaction by creditors to unanticipated defaults. 25 
Instead, the cut-off of new lending may have encouraged debtor 
23 Avramovic (1964), p. 46, provides data on these ratios 
of public debt service, actual or scheduled (if default 
occurred), as a proportion of exports: 
Year Argentina Bolivia Chile Colombia Peru 
1926 10.0 7.3 5.5 2.7 2.6 
1927 7.9 6.1 8.7 4.4 3.2 
1928 8.9 8.5 9.5 8.1 6.0 
1929 10.4 7.8 9.2 11.9 7.4 
1930 18.2 13.5 18.0 14.0 9.5 
1931 22.5 24.5 32.9 15.6 16.3 
1932 27.6 50.0 102.6 21.8 21.4 
1933 30.2 38.5 81.9 29.6 21.7 
Also see Table 1 for other debt burden ratios 1920 to 1945. 
24 Madden, Nadler, and Sauvain (1937), p. 110. 
25 Eichengreen and Portes (1985) , p. 6. See Graphs 1 to 5 
for the crossover points for dollar borrowings. 







Republic bond issue of $2.4 
million at 6\ due 1940. 
Republic bond issue of $29 
million at 8\ due 1947. 
Republic bond iss' i! of $14 
million at 7\ due 1958. 
Republic bond issue of $23 
million at 7\ due 1969. 
Default on sinking fund in 
December. 
Default on interest in 
January. Partial interest of 
2\ paid on 1922 58. 
1940 Default on principal of 1917 
s6 issue. 
1941 Partial interest of 1\ paid 
on 1922 s8. 
1946 Partial interest of .5\ paid 
on 1922 s8. 
1947 Default on principal of 1922 
s8 issue. 
1948 Presidential proposal of 
reduced interest payments at 
1\, rising to 3\ by 1955. 
$100 of interest arrears per 
$1000 bond to be capitalized 
in new bonds. FBPC gives 
provisional recommendation of 
approval. Partial interest 
of .2\ paid on 1922 58. 
1950 Bolivian Congress approves 
1948 debt plan, scheduled to 
commence in 1951. Never 
carried out by executive. 
1955 Token interest payment of .5\ 
paid on 1922 58. 
1957 June announcement of new plan 
-of service following 
prolonged negotiations with 
FBPC. 
1958 Publication of 1958 Plan with 
interest at 1\, rising to 3\ 
by 1963. Maturity extended 
to 1993 and 5\ of interest 
arrears to be capitalized by 
increasing par value of each 
$1000 by $100. Starting in 
1962, to be exchanged for new 
bonds with sinking ~und 
provisions. FBPC recommended 
approval. Full interest of 











Full interest payments of 1\. 
Remittances under 1958 Plan 
cease in July. Full interest 
of 1.5\ paid on 1927 57. 
Partial interest of .75\ paid 
on other issues. 
July announcement of reduced 
coupon payments in 1962-63 
but assurances of speedy 
return to compliance. Over 
70\ of bonds outstanding 
stamped (accepting 1958 
Plan) • 
Fail to deliver new bonds. 
Promise to issue in 1965. 
Partial interest paid of .75\ 
in 1962 and 1963 and of 1.75\ 
in 1964. 
Proposal for delivery of new 
bonds. 
Began exchange for new issue 
and resumed adj usted serv ice 
at 3\ but with no provision 
for any arrears. $62 million 
outstanding. 
Partial interest of 1.1\ paid 
on stamped bonds of all 4 
original issues. 
S47 million outstandinq. 











Republic bond issue of 
$18 million at 7\. 
Guaranteed Mortgage 
Bank issue of $20 
million at 6.5\. 
Republic bond issue of 
$42.5 million at 6\. 
Guaranteed Mortgage 
Bank issue of $20 
million at 6.75\. 
Guaranteed Mortgage 
Bank issue - of $10 
million at 6\. 
Republic bond issue of 
$27.5 million at 6%. 
Republic January bond 
issue of $45.9 million 
at 6\. Republic March 
bond issue of $16 
million at 6\. 
Guaranteed Mortgage 
Bank issue of $20 
million at 6\. 
Republic bond issue of 
$10 million at 6\. 
Guaranteed Mortgage 
Bank issue of $20 
million at 6\. 
Republ ic bond issue of 
$25 million at 6\. 
Default begins in 
August with failure to 
pay on interest and 
sinking fund for 
Republic 1927 6s issue. 
other issues follow in 
turn. 
Non-guaranteed 
municipal dollar bonds 
default. 
Resumption of service 
on trade obligations. 









passed setting aside 
all government revenues 
from copper and nitrate 
industries into 
Amortization Institute 
to service foreign 
debt. Reduced coupon 
payments to be 
announced each January, 
available only to bonds 
stamped in agreement 
with the Law. FBPC 
recommends refusal. 
Law 5580 enacted. 
Partial interest 
payments averaging 
1.25\ per annum paid on 
stamped bonds. 
By January over 80\ of 
national and guaranteed 
issues are stamped. 
December decree 
transfers $6 million 
away from debt payment 
but promises Chile will 
return to provisions of 
Law 5580. 
Law 7160 passed, 
setting extra tax on 
copper companies, 
depleting funds 
available for debt 
servicing. 
Law 8962 replaces Law 
5580, providing an 
issue of 1948 New Bonds 
with 46-year maturity 
to consolidate all 
dollar bond issues by 
exchange at par. 
Interest to be at 1. 5\ 
in 1948, rising to 3\ 
by 1954. All payments 
under Law 5580 to be 
available as 10-year 
scrip. FBPC recommends 
acceptance. 
• 












guaranteed $3 million 
at 7\. 
Republic issues $25 
million at 6\. 
Mortgage Bank issues $3 
million at 7\ and $5 
million at 6\. 
Republic issues $35 
million at 6\. 
Mortgag~ Bank issues $5 
million at 6\. 
Some non-guaranteed 
m u n i c i pal and 
departmental issues 
default. 
More municipal and 
departmental issues 
default. Mortgage Bank 









Two coupons on 1927 6s 
and one on 1928 6s paid 
1/3 cash (giving 2\ and 
1\ payments) and 2/3 
scrip (redeemed for 
cash in 1937). 
Payments of full annual 
interest on Republic 
issues in 4\ scrip 
(redeemed in 1946). 
of Payments of half 
annual interest 
Republic issues 





turned in $6 million in 
bonds purchased in the 






Decree 1388 offers 
settlement plan for 
Republic issues. Old 
issues to be exchanged 
at par for new 3' bonds 
due 1970 with 
convertible certificates 
for half of interest 
arrears from 1935-59. 
FBPC recommended 
refusal. 
Redeemed New Bonds 
offered out -in exchange 
for Mortgage Bank issues 
under same conditions 
except only 20\ of 
arrears covered and to 
non-guaranteed mortgage 
bond issues for 75\ of 
face value and no 
allowance for interest 
arrears. Government 
reported that half of 
all mortgage bonds were 
repurchased during 
default. 
Same offer extended to a 
municipal issue, again 
using redeemed New Bonds 
and with all past 
interest cancelled. 
Government reported 60\ 
of issue had been 
repurchased. Another 
municipal issue reached 
independent settlement. 
Only 10\ 
iss u e s 
unexchanged. 
of Republic 
rem a i n 
Departmental and other 
municipal issues settled 
by exchange at 120\ of 
face value for a new 
nationally-guaranteed 3\ 
issue. Government 
reported almost 50\ of 
these issues had been 
repurchased. 










Republic isuues $15 
million at 7\ and $50 
million at 6\. 
Province of Callao 
issues nationally-
guaranteed $1.5 million 
at 7.5\. 
Republic issues $25 
million at 6\. City of 
Lima issues non-
guaranteed $3 million 
at 6.5\. 
Republic issues default 
on both interest and 





budget item for debt 
service at .5\ but 
funds not transferred 
to fiscal agent. 
Payment of 
interest on 
issues of .5\. 
partial 
Republic 
Settlement reached on 
short-term dollar 
credits with payment of 
all arrears and 
interest reduced from 
6\ to 2\. 
FBPC takes over 
negotiations (upon 
disbandment of rival 
bon d hoI d e r s • 
co •• ittee) • Peru 
offers settlement on 
"Mexican basis" of one 
Peruvian sol per 
dollar. 
Bill introduced to 






settlement with interest 
at U, rising to n by 
1950, sinking fund 
payments at .5\ per 
annum, and all arrears 
to be cancelled. 
Law 10832 authorized 
government to resume 
payment on dollar and 
sterling bonds by 
issuing Series Exchange 
Bonds due 1997, one 
series for each of the 
Repubiic .and Callao 
issues and one for two 
sterling issues, paying 
interest of 1\ for 1947-
48, 2.5\ thereafter. 
All arrears to be 
cancelled. FBPC 
recommended refusal. 
New plan announced. As 
of 1953, a new set of 
Exchange Bonds due 1997 
to replace 1947 Series 
for Republic and Callao 
and providing new series 
for Lima issue, all 
payinq 3\ interest and 
with non-interest-
bearing scrip for 10\ of 
arrears of 1931-46. 
1951 offer extended to 
1947 Series for sterling 
bonds. 
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countries to consider defaulting since a crucial part ot the 
penalty of default is the refusal of further credit. 26 These 
countries were left with greatly incr~ased burdens of debt but 
severely reduced means of payment and no available instrument for 
international settlement through negotiation to substitute for 
default. 
The first default was by Bolivia in January of 1931, after 
its failure to meet sinking fund payments in December of 1930. 27 
When payments ~topped, the U.S. fi~cal agent for the issue (who 
cashed the bond's coupons as they came due with funds provided by-
the debtor)- then declared if to be in default and the bond 
contracts to be broken. Peru followed suit soon after in April 
as did Peruvian provincial and municipal governments. Chile 
succumbed to the combined pressures of revolution and a severe 
slump in the nitrate and copper industries in August, breaking 
its long record of compliance with external obligations. The 
government imposed exchange restrictions preventing the transfer 
of funds abroad, forcing the default of Chilean non-national debt 
as well. All three of these countries defaulted following 
political upheaval and the institution of revolutionary 
governments who tended to place a low priority on the maintenance 
of a good credit standing. Once the ice was broken, however, 
defaults by other Latin American countries (and by European 
26 See Sachs (1982). 
27 See Tables 2 to 5 for summaries of the debt histories of 
the defaulting countries of this study. 
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borrowers) followed in rapid succession. By 1934, only 
Argentina, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, out of all the 
Latin American states, had not suspended normal debt servicing. 28 
Default was made easier by its very commonness. The 
failure of the entire system went far beyond the 
capacity of individual bankers to ameliorate, and none 
tried . . . Capital markets were essentially closed to 
long-term movements and only functioned to sustain 
short-term flight to the United States, providing 
little incentive for conformity with the rUles. 29 
The loan contracts of the defaulted bond issues technically 
guaranteed against loss of principal or interest, usually by 
pledging the 'good faith and credit' of the government as well as 
by the common inclusion of a security clause assigning specific 
government revenues or properties 30 to the fulfillment of the 
stipulated servicing. However, when defaults occurred, it turned 
out that these guarantees were meaningless. The relevant assets 
were rarely wi thin reach of the creditors. Bondholders were 
faced with the difficult problem of a sovereign debtor, with the 
28 And even in Argentina, some non-national dollar bonds 
went into default for a brief period. It is sometimes argued 
that the readjustment of inter-ally debts and reparations 
payments in the 1920' s for the former creditors to the world, 
Br ita in, France, and Germany, set a tempting exampl e for the 
periphery, and in combination with the derogation of the gold 
clause by Britain in 1931 and the U.s. in 1933, succeeded in 
undermining Latin American belief in the sanctity of contracts. 
From Wal1ich (1943), p. 322. 
29 Fish10w (1985), p. 429. 
30 Revenues from natural resources or domestic monopolies 
such as railroads or the tobacco industry and properties such as 
bullion or commodities were popular backing assets. For example, 
Peru's nineteenth century loans were secured on its valuable 
guano deposits while a 1922 British loan to Brazil was backed by 
coffee. From Borchard (1951), Part II, Sec. VII. 
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rights and po .... ers of a state, unable to be sued without its 
consent, and over .... hom foreign creditors had negligible legal 
influence. The United states gove~nment refused to employ 
economic sanctions or to claim redress on behalf of its 
nationals, leaving bondholders with only negotiation through 
privately-formed committees as a means of arranging resumption of 
payments. 31 
Furthermore, defaulting countries gained the advantages of 
beiJ)g able to write off _ part of their debt through favora?le 
readjustment plans in the future as well as tne possibility of 
substantial buybacks of debt at a considerable discount since the 
uncertainty of default depressed bond prices by 75% or more. 32 
The debtor .... ould repurchase its own bonds in the open market at a 
price less than 100, a procedure sometimes allowed under the 
original bond contract. For example, of the 36 bonds considered 
in this study, 23 of the contracts allowed such redemptions at 
market prices. After default, with those contracts broken, 
countries engaged in this practice .... hether previously allowed or 
not. 
Table 6 summarizes the experience of the five debtors during 
defaul t, presenting estimates of buybacks at deeply-discounted 
prices in the period between the original abrogation of the bond 
contracts and the date of final and binding settlement. Peru was 
31 Borchard (1951), Part I, Sec. 1 and Part II, Sec. VII. 
32 The market price on Bolivian bonds dropped to 3 cents on 
the dollar in 1939. 
Table ,. IlATIONAL AND IlATIOIIALLY·CUAltANTEEO DOLlAR BONOS 
ISSUED 1. '1'11& 1920'.: aUYIACKS DUllING DEfAULT 
Country 
Arg.ntina 
10 ' •• ue. 
Bollvla 
4 l •• ue. 
ChUe 
12 ' •• ue. 
Colollbia 
6 l •• ue. 
P.ru 
4 ' •• ue. 
Value of bonda 






















(Int.r •• t rat.; 
aaa pr •• lu.) 
192)·28 
(6. 16' ; ·4 ) 
1911·28 
(7. SSt ; +304) 
1922·30 
(6.S.t ; +IS9) 
1926·28 
(6.55t ; +94) 
1927·28 
16.77t ; +1291 
Aaount out. tanding 
at default 
IV.ar of d.fault; 


















$8 H nat'l 
118 J; 





$12 K fro. 
original l •• u •• 
(19 J; 
SIS K fro. 1947 
Exchang. BondlO 






15, of nat'l 
S3t of ,uar. 
31t 
of whlc:h 
14t fro. orl,lnal l •• u.s 
repurc:ha.ed 1931·46 
17t fro. 1947 Exc:han,. Bonds 
repurcha.ed 1947-S2 
Notes: 
nat'l - bonds issued by the national government; 
guar. - bonds guaranteed by the national government. 
interest rate - average of yields to .aturity at issue dates 
weighted by principal issued. 
Baa premium - average premium over the U.S. Baa corporate rate 
in basis points in ..:ears of issue. 
Bolivia had buybacks in 1957 only. 
Colombia defaulted on sinking fund payments of its guaranteed issues 
in 1932, on interest payments of these issues in 1933, and on sinking 
fund and interest payments of its national issues in 1933. Final 
settlement was reached on its national issues in 1941 and on the 
guaranteed issues in 1942. As a result, its buyback. include the 
years 1933 through 1940 for its nationalissues (with the addition 
of $14,500 retired in 1941) and the years 1931 through 1941 for its 
guaranteed issues. 
Sources: 
FBPC (various vols.); authors' ~stimates. 
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most active in this process, purchasing 31\ of the principal 
outstanding at default at an average price of 21 cents on the 
dollar. About one-fourth of these buyb~cks occurred in the early 
years of default, but most took place in the late 1940's during 
the period of its unilateral offer to bondholders (at an average 
price of 22 cents). Colombia repurchased a smaller percentage 
but over a shorter period and is the only country directly 
accused by the Council of encouraging a low market price for its 
debt for the purpose of discounted redemption. 33 Chile too 
bought back a significant amount of its debt, with about one-
third occurring in the first few years of default. The Chilean 
government's sense of timing must have been less keen than that 
of Peru or Colombia because the effective discount was only 41\. 
The same might be said of Bolivia's government who failed to take 
advantage of the shockingly low prices to which their debt sank 
in the 1930's, repurchasing almost none. The net effect of this 
generally unobserved and uncontrollable activity on the part of 
debtors was to lighten the burden of debt before or during 
negotiations on adjusted service. 34 
Argentina stands out as the only major Latin American debtor 
to abide by its original bond agreements and continue full 
service on its national debt. Carlos Diaz-Alejandro (1983) 
33 See Appendix B.4. Colombia's Debt History for details. 
34 Argentina's bond contracts allowed repurchases through 
the sinking fund at market price. Between 1931 and 1936, it 
purchased a modest 15t, all through normal sinking fund payments, 
at an average price of 73. 
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argues that Argentina chose not to default on its bonds because 
of the over-riding importance of its export dependency on Britain 
whose financial institutions used their considerable political 
clout to force an agreement upon Argentina. The notorious Roca-
Runciman Treaty of ]'33 provided limited guarantees for Argentine 
exports in return for onerous concessions including continued 
debt service payments. The government must have believed that 
any tampering with debt service was sure to be commercially and 
poli tically costly. But i t ~eems that continued serv~cing also 
had high pol itical costs. The external economic pressures on 
Argentina were "additional causes of xenophobic antagonisms 
toward the very visible control that foreigners held over vital 
segments of the national economy, "35 antagonisms which were 
crucial in the subsequent rise of Peron. 36 
By the late 1930' s, many countries' abil i ty to service 
their debt had markedly improved. Many governments had made 
unilateral offers of readjusted service which, depending on their 
terms I a number of bondholders had accepted. Such acceptance 
gained the creditor some immediate coupon payments but at the 
risk of nUllifying the original legal commitment and lessening 
35 Mallon and Sourrouille (1975), p. 7. 
36 Ibid. 
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pressure on the borrower.)7 Bondholders indicated their approval 
of the new contract for repayment and the dissolution of the old 
by having their bonds stamped appropriately by the fiscal agent 
who would mark them as assenting or by exchanging the old bond 
certificates for new ones with the amended servicing obligations. 
Payments on coupons would then begin according to the new 
contract. Most of these offers were adhered to by the debtors 
(who had, after all, dictated their terms). 
unilateral offers could break down. 38 
However, even 
with the added advantage of having bought back some portion 
of their outstanding debt at well below par in foreign markets, 
the Latin American defaulters became disposed to negotiate a 
formal settlement (to replace the often confusing series of 
unilateral offers) with Britain's Corporation of Foreign 
Bondholders (established in 1868) or the United States' new 
Foreign Bondholders Protective Council (established in 1933), 
both private bondholders' committees. Readjustments were not 
negotiated by the issuing houses involved because of potential 
conflict of interest. Instead, the two private committees 
emerged. Britain's corporation was an experienced and respected 
37 Colombia I s unilateral offer of 1941, rejected by the 
Council, was never superceded by another agreement. Insufficient 
pressure by the bondholders, most of whom accepted the offer from 
the start, or anyone else, left the Republic with no incentive to 
increase servicing. 
38 In 1940, Chile regretfully admitted that it had reneged 
on the terms of its 1935 offer by diverting funds away from 
promised payments but continued to do so at an increasing rate, 
adding to the pressure for it to make a new offer of servicing. 
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institution by the interwar period while the U.S. 's Council 
served to replace a long series of ad hoc and sometimes competing 
bondholders' negotiating committees. 39 - However, "in the absence 
of the lure of future capital flows (and the threat of their 
blockage) the power of the U.S. Bondholders Protective Council 
was nil, ,,40 claims Fishlow (1985). Perhaps as a result of this 
limited bargaining power, discussions with debtors tended to 
revolve around the debtor's "capacity to pay", a phrase 
signifying the appropriate degree of debt forgiveness since the 
result was generally the consolidation and extension of existing 
debt with significant reductions in interest and extensions of 
maturities with some modicum of recognition paid to interest 
arrears. After a readjustment plan was agreed upon by both 
debtor government and bondholders' committee, bondholders were 
individually free to accept or reject the settlement, but once 
the committee accepted a plan and ceased negotiating, further 
concessions from the debtor became unlikely. 
In some cases, outside inducements assisted the negotiating 
process. In the post-1945 period, the new International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development would not lend to countries in 
default, a policy which in the immediate postwar years hit Latin 
Amer ica hardest. Chile had made a unilateral and ungenerous 
offer to holders of its defaulted issues in 1935, but then failed 
to uphold even its undemanding terms, to the continuing dismay of 
39 
40 
Eichengreen and Portes (1985), pp. 27-29. 
Fishlow (1985), p. 429. 
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the U.S. Council. It was not until Chile made an application for 
a $40 million loan from the IBRD in 1946 that it saw fit to 
renegotiate a more lasting debt readjustment plan. The Bank's 
policy on outstanding default was to take the country's attitude 
into consideration but not to play an intermediary role nor to 
disqualify the borrower. 41 Nevertheless, its pressure on Chile 
to settle with its bondholders was sufficient to elicit a new 
plan in 1948 which the U.S. Council could see fit to recommend. 
The day after Chile announced its settlement, the IBRD announced 
its approval of a $16 million loan to Chile. The Chilean 
settlement provided new 46-year bonds in exchange for national, 
Mortgage Bank, and municipal external bonds. Interest arrears 
were to be compensated as arranged under the earlier plan which 
had provided variable annual payments averaging 20\ of the past 
interest due since 1935 (with no capitalization). Current and 
future interest, originally contracted at 6 to 7\, would be paid 
at a rate of 1.5\ in 1948, rising to 3% in 1954. By comparison, 
the yield on U.s. Baa corporate bonds in 1948 was 3.47\. Most of 
the old bonds had been due in the early 1960's so the adjustment 
of maturity to 1993 represented a thirty-year extension. 
The terms of individual agreements varied but in general, 
the ones that lasted were the result of negotiations with the 
bondholder organizations and provided interest rate reductions 
ranging from 50 to 70\ of the original rate (leaving a new rate 
of 3\ in most cases) and extensions of maturities by twenty to 
41 Mason and Asher (1973), pp. 155-8. 
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thirty years. In general, a partial payment for unpaid interest 
was offered, summed without capitalization, often in the form of 
extra bonds. Chile, Colombia, and Peru achieved settlements of 
this type in 1948, in 1941, and 1953 respectively. The maturity 
of Peru's debt was stretched out to 50 years while Colombia's was 
only 30 years. Chile's settlement included payment of about 12% 
of its unpaid interest since default, Colombia's included about 
20%, and Peru's included about 15%. In 1958, after many failed 
attempts, Bolivia reached a more forgiving arrangement, involving 
a 35-year extension of maturity, a 3% interest rate, and 
provisions to pay less than 8% of accumulated unpaid interest. 
It is interesting to note that the longer a debtor held out, 
the better it fared in the conditions of settlement. Colombia 
settled unilaterally but early and so paid more. Overall, the 
level of debt forgiveness involved in these settlements was 
clearly substantial. The yield on u.s. Baa corporate bonds 
ranged from 4.3% in 1941 to 3.5% in 1948 to 3.7% in 1953 and 4.7% 
in 1958. 42 Thus, the new contracts for the defaulting countries 
provided finance at less than the u.s. Baa market yield whereas 
the original contracts yielded consistently more than these 
rates. 
The final settlements achieved by these interwar defaulting 
debtors, after long and tangled negotiations and many false 
starts, can be characterized as containing a realistic element of 
debt forgiveness. with an acceptable agreement in hand, 
countries could return to paths of growth and development 
42 From Banking and Monetary statistics (1943). 
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unhindered by an excessive overhang of debt. By 1945, the ratio 
of the stock of public external debt to yearly exports for Latin 
America as a whole had declined substantially to .77 43 , 
benefitting from the combined effects of the recovery of 
international trade and the widespread practice of repurchasing 
bonds below par. 
4. Estimating the Extent of Default and Debt Forgiveness 
In this section, we estimate the extent to which the debtor 
countries reduced the burden of debt servicing via suspension of 
debt payments and renegotiation of debt contracts. To measure 
the extent to which debtors escaped the burden of debt servicing, 
we calculate the present value of the borrowing and net 
repayments of bonds issued in the 1920's and 1930's for several 
Latin American countries. This measure is calculated using all 
of the long-term nationally-guaranteed bond debt issued in 
dollars and outstanding through the 1930's for five Latin 
American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, and 
Peru. A comparison of these measures for defaulters and non-
43 Diaz-Alejandro (1983), pp. 27-28, 
More specifically, from Table 1, the ratio of the stock of public 












defaulters will indicate the effective level of debt forgiveness 
inherent in the process of default and settlement as well as the 
direct ex post benefits of choosing default. 44 
All nationally-guaranteed dollar bonds issued after 1920 
were included,45 each issue being tracked from the date of issue 
until redemption (or 1980). Dollar debt in the form of bonds 
constitutes the majority of public debt for all of these 
countries, and the debt of the central or national governments is 
usually the dominant component-of total foreign debt. 
Dominick and Dominick, a New York investment house, 
published a compilation of all foreign loans issued in the United 
states and still outstanding in 1936. These listings provided 
information on principal amount, issue price, and contract 
provisions for the sinking fund. The bonds were then followed 
from year to year, using a variety of sources46 to obtain data on 
prices, amount of the principal outstanding at year's end, 
44 Other authors have calculated similar measures for other 
samples of bonds. Eichengreen and Portes (1986) use a basket of 
33 dollar bonds issued in the 1920' s by foreign governments or 
with government guarantees and estimate the realized rate of 
return to lenders to be 3.25\. They do not consider the impact 
of discounted buybacks. Lindert and Morton (1987) track all 
bonds issued by ten governments from 1850 to 1970, including 
Argentina and Chile. They calculate a number of summary measures 
in both real and nominal terms, finding that bondholders received 
a positive return premium of .44\ overall and of 1.21\ for bonds 
issued from 1915 to 1945. 
45 A Bolivian issue of 1917 with 23-year maturity was 
included because it marks the first of Bolivia's small borrowings 
in the New York market. 
46 The main sources used were the annual Report of the 
Foreign Bondholders Protective Council and the monthly Bank and 
Quotations Record. 
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interruptions of contractual payments on interest or principal, 
and the conditions of subsequent resumption of servicing. In 
all, the bonds followed consisted of fourteen Argentine bonds on 
which no default occurred and four Bolivian, twelve Chilean, six 
Colombian, and four Peruvian issues, all of which experienced 
default, as well as the exchange bonds offered by each defaulting 
country as part of its default settlement. 
For each bond, information on market prices, on contractual 
interest obligations, and on amounts outstanding for each year 
was combined to generate estimates of annual payments of interest 
and principal. We assume that principal payments were made at 
market prices when sinking funds allowed repurchase at prices 
below par or when unrecorded buybacks occurred. Information on 
the extent and terms of debt buybacks is problematic only for the 
first few years after the onset of default. Almost all of the 
original contracts allowed repurchases at market value, and prior 
to default, all repurchases were reported in a timely fashion to 
the fiscal agents. Buybacks during the period of default did not 
get reported at all to either the Councilor the agent until 
settlement negotiations began and then only intermittently until 
a final settlement was reached and relations normalized. All of 
these countries initiated negotiations soon after default at 
which time total repurchases during the preceding period were 
confessed. The gap in reporting rarely exceeds three or four 
years. Equal repurchasings during each year were assumed if no 
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SUMKARY OF RESULTS 




Net present Present 
value value 
(lIi11ions $) ratio 
.... ---_ ........... _-------------_ ...... _---------_._------------------ ... _----
258.59 323.12 64.53 1. 25 
49.13 26.32 -22.81 0.54 
178.12 99.25 -78.S7 0.56 
46.59 39.74 -6.S5 0~S5 
54.45 28.0S -2.6.37 0.52 
Principal Repayment Present 
outstanding after value 
at default default ratio 
(millions $) (m1111ons $) post-default 
59.42 4.63 0.08 
260.73 SO.39 0.31 
65.53 41.19 0.63 
88.36 34.38 0.39 
Results are based on national and nationally-guaranteed bonds. 
The base years for present value calculations are 1920 for totals 
and 1931 for post-default amount •. 
The di.count rate used i. the yield to .aturity on U.S. long 
lovernment bonds. 
Borrowings are actual principal received. 
Repayments are actual payments on interest and principal 
received by the bond trustees. 
The present value ratio i. the ratio of repayments to borrowings, 
both discounted to 1920. 
Default occurred in 1932 for Colombia and in 1931 for other defaultors. 
The present value ratio post-default i. the ratio of repayments after 
default to principal outstanding at default, both discounted to 1931. 
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there were service provisions tor stamped (indicating acceptance 
ot revised contractual obligations) as well aa unstamped bonda, 
using reported information on acceptanc~s. 
The payments for all bonds in each year were summed so that 
national totals could be calculated. The pattern of receipts and 
payments for each country are displayed in Graphs 1 to 5. 
Present values of the payments were calculated using a risk-free 
discount rate, the yield to maturity on u.s. government bonds of 
comparable length. 47 This discounting evaluates the yield on 
issues from the investor's point of view, assuming that investors 
chose Latin American government bonds as long-term holdings~ 
Finally, the resulting present values of borrowings, payments I 
and net payments and the ratio of payments to principal were 
calculated as summary measures. The ratio of repayments to debt 
flotations can exceed 1.0 if the debt is mostly repaid and at 
coupon rates in excess of the u.s. government rate. The ratio 
will be less than 1. 0 if the risk premium on coupon rates was 
insufficient to compensate for the non-payments of interest and 
principal and for the buybacks at discounted prices. 
As can be seen from Table 7, Argentina paid an enormous sum 
in present value terms for the monies it borrowed abroad. Its 
stream of payments on interest and principal turned positive in 
1928 and remained so except for 1937 when a new credit influx 
pushed it negative again. (See Graph 1.) The present value 
ratio of payments to principal reveals that when adjusted to 
47 See Table A.ll in the appendices. 
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present values, Argentina paid out 1.25 times what it received. 
The other debtors appear to have done very well in their dealings 
wi th international capital markets. The net present values of 
their dollar bonds to investors are definitively negative, and 
their present value ratios are well below unity. By borrowing 
heavily in the 1920's and then defaulting, these countries spread 
out their repayments over a much longer period of time than 
Argentina who repaid promptly. (See Graphs 2 to 5.) Chile, the 
biggest borrower after Argentina, acheived effective debt 
forgiveness of almost 50%. Peru, the most successful defaulter 
as measured by present value ratios, repaid just over half of 
principal in present value terms, although on substantially 
smaller total borrowings than Chile. Bolivia, essentially 
reneging on its debt obligations for over thirty years, gained 
forgiveness equivalent to Chile's for the moderate sums it 
managed to borrow in the 1920' s. Colombia, on the other hand, 
defaul ted completely on its obI igations for a very short time 
(actually paying no interest for only three years) and quickly 
made a unilateral offer to settle, giving its debt a small 
negative net present value and leaving its present value ratio 
substantially higher than the other three defau1 ters a1 though 
still well below unity. These levels of debt forgiveness were 
indeed an outcome of post-default behavior, as is made clear by 
the bottom half of Table 7. 
Naturally, the defaulting countries display present value 
ratios substantially lower for the stream of payments after 
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default than thos8 over the entire lives of the bonds. 
Consequently, although principal was never forgiven for any of 
these countries, cancellation of unpaid interest and buybacks at 
less than par had an equivalent effect. But it is also important 
to note that the present value ratios are substantially above 
zero, indicating that much of the debt was indeed repaid despite 
lengthy periods of default. 
Thus, default resulted in substantial debt relief in the 
longer run, ranging from 15\ to 48\. This relief was not 
completely intended but was the j oint product of unobservable 
debtor activity (in redeeming bonds at below par) and the limited 
negotiating power of the Foreign Bondholders' Protective Council. 
It was not that the Council was oblivious to behavior such as 
debt buybacks but rather that it had no choice but to accept the 
inevitable. These countries had defaulted and reasonable 
settlements according to capacity to pay needed to be arranged. 
5. The Repercussions of Default in the 1940'5 and 1950's 
Argentina paid dramatically more for the foreign capital it 
had borrowed in the 1920's than did the four defaulters. Were 
there offsetting advantages that accrued to Argentina in future 
decades? One legacy of the 1930's defaults was sharply 
restricted access by ill. developing countries to international 
capital markets until the late 1960's. . However, Argentina 







SUMMARY OF EXTERNAL FINANCE RATIOS: 1950 to 1964 
(in ') 
Fifteen-year averages of ratios of various categories of 
external finance to exports: 
Official 
Government Private Transfers Total 
-0.473 5.0085 0.0431 9.1614 
1. 6654 2.8509 22.046 36.502 
4.0817 2.7391 1.8566 13.792 
2.4770 3.7858 0.5367 8.0554 
1.4958- 5.9489 - 1-.0589 1-5.685 
-
Table S. (cont.) SUMMARY OF EXTERNAL FINANCE RATIOS: 1950 to 1964 
(in ') 
Ratios of five-year averages of various categories of external 
finance to five-year average of exports: 
Government Private 
1950-54 1955-59 1960-64 1950-54 1955-59 1960-64 
Argentina -0.477 -4.727 3.5105 1.3695 6.0492 6.6369 
Bolivia 1.9406 -3.777 11.145 -0.446 1.6698 7.3441 
Chile l.0719 0.0706 10.895 -l.435 -0.232 9.5820 
Colombia 2.6878 -0.204 4.9753 3.6588 -2.537 11.367 
Peru l. 0223 . 3.3736 0:3252 l.0677 . 9.8948 . 6.7967 
Table 8. (cont.) SUMMARY OF EXTERNAL FINANCE RATIOS: 1950 to 1964 
(in ') 
Ratios of five-year averages of various categories of external 
finance to five-year average of exports: 
Official Transfers Total 
1950-54 1955-59 1960-64 1950-54 1955-59 
Argentina 0 0.0107 0.1227 l. 2279 7.5454 
Bolivia 4.2605 32.028 26.945 5.9781 43.662 
Chile 0.1818 2.8681 2.2941 4.0053 10.624 
Colombia 0.0492 0.2256 1.3258 6.8498 -2.067 
Peru l. 0677 9.8948 6.7967 13.570 25.932 
Notes: 
Exports are of goods and services. 
Government external finance includes local and central government 
nonmonetary assets and liabilities. 








Total external finance is the sum of government and private external 
finance, official transfers and net direct investment. 
All data taken from Tables A.1. to A.10. 
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through the issuance of dollar bonds in the late 1930' B. The 
government retired all $246 million of its national bonds in 1937 
with the issuance of $129 million of 3~-year external conversion 
bonds and sUbstantial domestic debt. In 1938, an additional $25 
million 10-year bond was floated. 48 The risk premium was 
slightly lower than for its earlier loans, but a conversion loan 
is inherently less risky. The new issues yielded an average 4.7% 
when the U.S. rate on Baa corporate bonds hovered around 5.2\. 
(Earlier borrowi~g had yielded 6.2', approximately equal to the 
Baa rate over that period.) Thus, Argentina's good behavior aid 
seem to earn it some return in easier credit access during the 
1930' s when capital markets were closed to most Latin American 
countries. However, such credit access was short-lived and was 
ostensibly provided merely to insure repayment of earlier bonds. 
Argentina, as will be seen below, received no special treatment 
a ~ter this episode in the late 1930 IS. (See Table 8.) 
In the period 1930 to 1945, a number of Latin American 
governments were repatriating, and thereby significantly 
reducing, both foreign debt and equity claims. By 1945, a large 
portion of the external debt of Latin American countries had been 
repurchased 
below par. 
in the open market, often at prices dramatically 
Meanwhile, Argentina was repurchasing at close to 
48 See Appendix B for details of Argentina's debt history. 
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par49 and redeeming at par a good part of its external debt, 
causing its stock of public external debt to drop by 55% between 
1940 and 1945. In addition, the Chilean and Colombian 
governments took over some of the bonds of non-national entities 
as part of default settlement plans in the early 1940's, causing 
their stocks of public external debt to rise. (See Table 1.) 
For dollar bonds specifically, between 1930 and 1945, the value 
of all Latin American issues outstanding dropped by almost 40%.50 
In the late 1940' s and the 1950' s, net flows of external 
finance switched direction and became positive again. In these 
years, private capital flows to Latin America were much higher 
than official government flows and predominantly took the form of 
direct investment. International financial and money markets had 
not yet recovered from the 1930's so the only indirect investment 
was a modest and erratic flow of suppliers' credits. As late as 
1960, Latin America owed half of its total stock of debt to 
suppliers. 51 Direct investment, on the other hand, was somewhat 
larger, .undertaken mostly by U. S. enterprises through the 
reinvestment of earnings, starting off in the petroleum industry, 
then increasingly spreading to manufacturing and the extraction 
49 The prices of Argentine issues never fell much below 75 
after 1935, leaving the government unable to reduce its debt at 
the hefty discount available to defaulters and seemingly 
unwilling to take advantage of what discount there was. Perhaps 
such behavior, although technically allowed under the bond 
contracts, would have threatened the conversion bonds. 
50 
51 
See Table A.13 in the Appendices. 
Griffith-Jones (1984), pp. 26-29. 
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of other minerals. The net inflow ot private capital, direct and 
indirect, averaged $740 million per annum for 1950 to 1956. 
However, for 1954 to 1956, prompted by economic and political 
instability in the region, private long-term capital flowed out 
at an estimated rate of $40 million per annum. In 1957, 
sufficient change had occurred to draw this speculative flow 
inward again and at a level twice that for the early 1950's.52 
Off icia1 flows from the U. S. Export-Import Bank and IBRD 
provided some additional capital through the 1950's. Of the five 
countries of this study, Chile and Argentina benefitted most from 
Export-Import credits, granted for the purposes of financing 
commercial arrears on imports from the u.s. as well as for 
infrastructure proj ects, while Chile and Colombia received the 
bulk of IBRD funds to this group, the funds being directed 
towards the expansion of electric power and transportation 
facilities. 53 However~ both private and official external 
fin~nce remained at relatively low levels and varied 
substantially from year to year in response to political as much 
as economic events. 
The flows of external finance to each of the five countries 
over the whole period of 1950 to 1964 are summarized in Table 8. 
These trends are of direct relevance to the analysis of the cost 
of default to the borrowing countries because it was not until 
the 1950 I s that the world had recovered from depression and a 
52 
53 
Pan-American Union (1958), pp. 85-90. 
See Table A.14 of the appendices. 
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second world war. Although flows of international capital are 
modest in this decade, the supposed penalty for defaulting must 
have been paid then, if at all. 54 Therefore, it is of interest 
to note that as a percentage of exports, the defaulters managed 
to obtain equivalent or larger capital flows than Argentina. 
Over the period of 1950 to 1964, all five countries 
experienced rising flows of external finance as shown in Table 8 
(broken down into categories of government sector, private 
sector, official transfers, and a composite including the 
previous categories and direct investment). Argentina does 
compare favorably with the other four countries in its ratio of 
private finance to exports. It achieved reschedulings which 
consolidated short-term obligations into longer term debt both in 
1956 after the overthrow of the Peron regime and again in 1959-
60, the latter assistance package constituting its first 
significant postwar inflow of capital. Chile received slightly 
more government finance over the period than the others because 
of higher inflows in the early 1960's (partly bilateral 
refinancing and partly loans for earthquake reconstruction). It 
is rather amusing that Bolivia, the worst behaved of the five in 
terms of timely settlement of default, not reaching a lasting 
agreement until 1958, displays the highest ratio of external 
finance to exports (although only because of official transfers) 
54 See Eichengreen (1987) for some econometric tests of this 
hypothesis. 
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It is difficult to argue that any particular trend 
inevi tably emerges from perusal of this data. 55 Not only must 
the accuracy of capital flow information for this period be 
somewhat suspect, especially given the existence of conflicting 
estimates from different sources, but the modest size of the 
flows and their high variability preclude any strong conclusions. 
As different categories of external finance waxed and waned over 
the period, switching the total flow from negative to positive 
and back again, trends are possible to identify only through the 
use of multi-year averaging. These switches can in many 
instances be explained by particular political events, e.g., a 
new American foreign policy or the overthrow of a regime 
unfriendly to foreign capital. Nevertheless, it can be said that 
Argentina, having conscientiously retained its creditworthiness 
by honoring its debt service obligations, did not receive 
nr\-iceably better treatment in the 1950' s in return for its 
3dmirable behavior in the previous two decades. Any lastir:'g 
effect of reputation formed on the basis of behavior in the 
1930's was an incidental factor in determining access to foreign 
capital in the 1950's. 
55 In a simila~ vein, Eichengreen (1987) fails to find 
evidence that default in the interwar years affected the ability 
to borrow in the period 1945 to 1955 from cross-section 
regressions of all external debts of governments for 32 countries 
in 1955 and regressions of private portfolio lending for 18 Latin 
American countries for 1946 to 1955. 
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6. Conclusions 
The defaults of the 1930's present lessons for contemporary 
experience because these countries actually ceased payment on 
their foreign debts and these defaults were acknowledged, 
accepted, and eventually negotiated on favorable terms to the 
debtors. Examining the consequences of defaults that emanatec 
from an era with so many similarities to the present provides, at 
the least, some interesting commentary on policies bein9 
advocated today for Latin American debtors. 
From the borrower's perspective, the costs of default 
involve both a direct component of actual payments made or 
existing debts and an indirect component of reputational effect~ 
on future access to credit. On the basis of the five countrie~ 
studied here, it seems that both of these costs were low, so lo~ 
a~ to be negative. The empirical results on actual payments over 
the- life of all of each country's dollar bonds indicate the level 
of debt forgiveness that occurred. That relief was substantial, 
if the basis for comparison is the experience of Argentina, thE 
single country that did not default. The debt burden of thE 
defaulting countries was lightened not only by liberal final 
agreements with bondholders but also by the debtors' practice of 
secretly entering the bond market and buying their debt at dee~ 
-
discounts during default. It also seems that the costs of 
default in terms of future external financial flows were 
negligible. When the countries returned to international capital 
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markets in the 1950'S, no apparent systematic difference between 
the defaulters and the non-defaulter emerges, the patterns being 
dominated by other factors. This result is consistent with 
findings in Eichengreen (1987) and Lindert and Morton (1987). 
The terms of the final agreements settling the defaults of 
the 1930' s were highly favorable to debtors and, contrary to 
current reschedul ing practices , involved a sharing of losses. 
The unpaid interest during the period of default was summed 
without capitalization and added to the total stock of principal 
due. The resulting total was consolidated into a new bond issue 
with a maturity of 30 to 50 years. Full present values were not 
demanded, and there was little fastidiousness about interest 
arrears. Maturities were extended to concessionary lengths while 
interest rates were reduced below yields available on comparably 
risky assets. These deals were struck with realism, as fair 
co- promises between creditors and debtors -coping with the 
t~ermath of severe un~oreseen external shocks which renaered the 
debtors' abrogation of contracts excusable. 45 
Fishlow (1985) describes nineteenth-century lending to Latin 
America as a process of default-induced disruption of capital 
flows followed by timely settlements allowing the resumption of 
lending for developmept purposes. By comparison, it seems then 
that the trouble with the interwar period was not default per se 
but the general breakdown of trading and capital flows which 
45 See Grossman and Van Huyck (1985) for a formal model of 
excusable default. 
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removed incentives for rapid adjustment of servicing. Henry 
Wallich (1943) observed that debt forgiveness was both desirable 
and necessary to relieve the overhang of Latin American debt and 
improve the prospects of a return of international capital flows 
to the region. Thus, a possible lesson of the tumultuous 
interwar experience is that there may be potential gains to 
creditor and debtor from negotiating reasonable default 
settlements and the debtor's reentry to the international system 
~ quickly. 
Changes in the regulatory, legal, and political environment 
have led to a different outcome so far in the 1980's. No debt 
forgiveness has yet been granted, partly because the U.S. serves 
as the contract enforcer that was lacking in the 1930's. As a 
result, it is quite possible that today's process of settlement 
through temporary reschedulings has been to the detriment of 
debtors and creditors and that the failure to reach realistic 
settlements in the timely manner of the 19th century may instead 
recreate much of the pain of the interwar period. 
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Appendix B. Country Debt Histories 
This appendix provides more detailed histories of debt for 
each of the five countries. These descriptions are drawn 
primarily from FBPC Annual Reports, notes in the IMF Balance of 
Payments Yearbooks, and Bitterman (1973). 
B.1. Argentina's Debt History 
Between 1923 and 1928, 289.8 mill ion of dollar bonds were 
publicly offered by the Republic of Argentina of which nine 
issues were contracted at 6% and one of $20 million at 5.5\. Of 
the ten issues, all allowed retirement through purchases at 
market prices and further afl-owed the government to increase 
these sinking -fund_payments (the total to be spent in principal 
payments each year) at will. 
Argentina's aggregate demand faced severe deflationary 
pressure in the early 1930's because of the fall in export 
demand. Surprisingly, Argentina achieved a shallower post-1929 
decline than the United States through a combination of 
relatively loose mone~ary and fiscal policies and the suspension 
of convertibility to gold in 1929. However, total debt service 
payments by the government, mainly to foreigners, occupied an 
increasing share of the budget, rising to 28\ of government 
expenditures in 1933. 1 Nevertheless, the Argentine government 
1 Diaz-Alejandro (1983), p. 20. 
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resisted pressures to default, preserving full payments of 
interest and principal despite the lack of new loans in the early 
1930's. 
Diaz-Alejandro (1983) attributes this good behavior to the 
monopsony power of Britain over Argentine exports. The Roca-
Runciman Treaty of 1933/ the formal expression of this influence, 
guaranteed that 
the United Kingdom ... will not impose any restriction 
on the imports of chilled beef into the United Kingdom 
from Argentina ... below the quantity imported in ... 
1932, unless it appears to the Government to be 
necessary in order to secure a remunerative level of 
prices ... [In exchange for which) Whenever any system 
of exchange control is in operation in Argentina, 
there shall be available, for the purpose of meeting 
applications for current remittances from Argentina to 
the united Kingdom, the full amount of sterling 
exchange arising from the sale of Argentine products in 
the United Kingdom ... 2 
The treaty also provided for moderate sterling and Swiss Franc 
loans to Argentina. Most importantly, the enforcement incentive 
spilled over into continued payments by Argentina on its dollar 
bonds as well. 
Full service was maintained on all of Argentina's national 
bonds throughout their history, but both provincial and municipal 
dollar bonds did experience interruptions in payments which were 
soon readjusted. Bet1Neen 1925 and 1930, Argentina's provinces 
borrowed $103 million in bonds of which some underwent default in 
1932 and 1933. Adjustments involving exchange bonds at lower 
interest rates but covering all of the original principal and 
2 Articles I and II, Roca-Runciman Treaty (1933). 
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uncapitalized interest arrears were reached in 1935 to 1938, with 
the remaining few settled in 1941. Municipalities also borrowed 
in this period, totalling $28 million in bonds between 1924 and 
1928 and defaulting on some in 1932 and 1933. Agreements were 
reached in 1938 to redeem some issues early with all interest 
paid, in 1939 to exchange some for new bonds, and in 1942 to 
redeem some at par with full interest. 
The outstanding balances of $246 million on Argentina's ten 
national issues were retired in 1936 and 1937, funded partially 
from the proceeds of a new loan of $128.5 million of 35-year 
Conversion Dollar Bonds carrying interest at 4.5% and 4% 
(yielding 4.6%) and partially by the issuance of domestic debt. 
In 1938, another new loan of $25 million at 4.5% (yielding 5.1\) 
was issued to pay for property acquired by the Ci.ty of Buenos 
Aires and for a national public-work~ program. 
Bondholders Protective council was happy to point out, 
The Argentine Government, unique in Latin America as 
the only Government which has met throughout the 
depression full service on its bonds, was again able 
this year to profit by this enviable record by raising 
another loan on this market. 3 
However, the bulk of these new bonds merely replaced older issues 
rather that bringing a new net flow of capital into the country 
although the lower interest rates of 1936 to 1938 enabled 
Argentina to trade 6\ bonds for 4% or 4.5% new issues with 
extended maturities. 
3 Foreign Bondholders Protective Council (1938), p. 12. 
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Argentina's payment patterns for the years 1936 and 1937, 
when redeeming all outstanding dollar bonds while issuing a much 
lesser amount of new dollar debt appear extreme unless all debt, 
internal as well as external, is considered. (See Graph 1.) 
Between 1936 and 1937, funded (long-term) dollar debt fell by 
$80.7 million and total national foreign debt (including non-
dollar and short-term obligations) fell by $91.5 million (mostly 
because of a decline in short-term loans). However, domestic 
debt over this period rose by $86.6 million, due primarily to an 
increase in domestic long-term debt, part of a continuing pattern 
of steadily rising internal debt over the years 1936 to 1940. 
Thus, the dramatic jump in net payments on dollar bonds was 
offset by changes in domestic borrowing. 
Between 1946-and 1949, under Argentina's new 1946-policy to 
convert external debt to int~rnal debt, the government used 
reserves earned from export surpluses during World War II to pay 
off its foreign debt and to repurchase its railroads from British 
investors. All national dollar bonds were called in for 
redemption. It also required its provinces and cities to 
repatriate as much of their foreign debt as bore interest greater 
than the rate fixed for Argentine domestic securities. All 
outstanding provincial and municipal dollar debt was redeemed as 
a result. 
Again, the payments pattern illustrated in Graph 1 require 
explanation. During 1946, funded dollar debt fell from $139.5 
million to zero while total national foreign debt fell from 
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$159.0 million to $34.1 million (including the redemption of the 
60.2 .i11ion Swiss Franc loan of 1933). Total debt service was 
not as burdensome as these large external principal payments seem 
to indicate because of the government's spending of the dollar 
balances it had earned during World War II from export surpluses 
as well as the steady rise of domestic debt (as in the 1930's). 
This policy of conversion of foreign debt extended to non-
dollar issues as well. In 1946, Argentina redeemed all of its 
Roca Agreement Swiss Franc Loan of 1933, having already called 
its loans in gold pesos in 1934, those in lire in 1938, and those 
in pesetas in 1942. By the end of 1949, it had retired all 
national obligations payable in sterling except for one Roca 
Agreement Loan of 1933, of which £4.2 million remained. 
Argentina - contracted no ~urther long-term debt in the form of 
dollar bond~ issued in the u.s; ~arket. 
By 1950, Argentina had accumulated large arrears on 
unercial debts to u.s. suppliers and banks, having used up all 
of its reserves earned in wartime to redeem external long-term 
debt and purchase foreign-owned assets, especially the Bri tish-
owned railroads, as well as covering postwar trade deficits. In 
1950, the u.s. Export-Import Bank provided a loan ot $96.5 
million at 3.5' to a consortium of Argentinian banks, guaranteed 
by the central bank, to assist in the liquidation of these 
arrears on private and public short-term dollar debt to u.s. 
commercial creditors. However, in 1956, after the overthrow of 
the Peron regime, refundin9"- was again necessary to consolidate" 
47 
$353 million of trade-related debt with Europe, resulting in the 
establishment of the Paris Club in May of that year. 
In 1959, Argentina received its first significant inflow of 
capital in the postwar period, in the form of credits to assist 
stabilization. The IMF provided $100 million on standby, a 
consortium of nine U.S. banks provided $75 million to finance 
arrears, and 54 European banks supplied matching funds, 
conditional on the IMF standby which required Argentina to unify 
its exchange rate. In 1962-63, at which point Argentina had 
$2649 million outstanding of funded external public debt (mostly 
medium-term supplier credits), the servicing of which took up 
about 25% of exports, another refunding was achieved with the 
help of the IMF, the u.s. Treasury and U.S. AID in exchange for 
instituting anti-inflationary policies and devaluing the exchange 
rate. 
B.2. Bolivia's Debt History 
Between 1917 and 1928, Bolivia publicly offered four issues 
of dollar bonds totalling $68.4 million at 6%, 7%, and 8%. All 
four issues allowed retirement through purchase at market prices 
with sinking fund payments set by the bond contract. Unable to 
negotiate short-term loans from American banks in 1930 to 
postpone debt-servicing pressures, Bolivia defaulted on its 
interest payments in January of 1931 (having defaulted on sinking 
fund payments in December of 1930) and then, in 1940 and 1947, on 
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the principal of its 6% and 8% loans respectively. Only $3 
million was repatriated durinq the default period, 1931 to 1969, 
at discounts of over 80\. Nevertheless, by 1944 unpaid interest 
(of $60 million) just exceeded principal outstanding (of $59 
million) . 
In June of 1948, a presidential announcement proposed a plan 
of reduced interest payments starting at 1\ and rising to 3\ by 
1955, with past interest compromised by the issuance 
$100 bond for each $1000 outstanding to cover 18 
arrears. Bolivia had amassed $78 million of arrears 
of a new 
years of 
of which 
this scheme would capitalize 7%. However, the Bolivian Congress 
failed to approve this proposal (as well as the national budget) 
before retiring for the year. Subsequent general political 
turmoil, including a new president in 1949, delayed passage of 
the debt plan until_ 1950. This plan was _ never executed due to 
procrastination by the executive in the interim, followed by a 
~tary coup in May of 1951, and then the new presidency of Paz 
Estenssoro in April of 1952. 
In June of 1957, the terms of a new plan of service were 
announced for Bolivia's four defaulted dollar bonds, of which $56 
million remained outs~andinq in public hands. Published in June 
of 1958, this 1958 Plan proposed that each $1000 bond be stamped 
to indicate a new par value of $1100, the additional amount beinq 
in full payment of unpaid interest to the first coupon date in 
1957 and constitutinq about 5\ of the accumulated arrears. 
Interest payments on the new par value, beqinninq in the second 
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half of 1957 would be made at 1% through 1959, at 1.5\ for 1960 
and 1961, at 2\ for 1962 and the first half of 1963, and at 3\ 
for the second half of 1963 and thereafter to maturity in 1993. 
Beginning in 1962, the stamped bonds were to be exchanged for new 
dollar bonds which would be provided with a cumulative sinking 
fund, of 1.5% per annum for 1962 through 1966 and 1\ thereafter, 
to retire the bonds through purchases in the market or through 
drawings by lot at par. The offer remained open for acceptance 
through 1964, then was extended to 1969. From 1958 to 1964, any 
bond stamped received all interest paid since 1958. Because the 
Bolivian government was undertaking a comprehensive monetary and 
economic stabilization program involving extensive reforms of 
government fiscal policy, the U.S. Foreign Bondholders' 
Protective council recommended acceptance of this settlement 
plan~ By ·Oecember of 1961, over 70\ of outstanding bonds _ had 
. . 
been stamped, indicating bondholders' approval of the 1958 Plan. 
Interest was paid according to the 1958 offer from 1958 
through the first coupon date of 1960. However, in July of 1960, 
remittances ceased. In Oecember of 1961, the government 
announced one coupon payment of $8.25 per $1100 bond, Le., 
available to stamped bonds only, for each of the years 1962 and 
1963, an effective interest rate of .75\, but promised two coupon 
payments in 1964 (and did pay a 1. 75% rate) and indicated its 
intention to return to full compliance with the 1958 Plan as soon 
as possible. The November 1964 military coup caused some delay 
_-_-i~.providing the promised new bonds, and so in March of 1966, a 
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new proposal for delivery of these bonds was announced, but again 
a long delay ensued during which economic conditions worsened. 
In 1969, negotiations were finally completed under which Bolivia 
resumed adjusted service on its 61.9 million of outstanding 
dollar bonds, paying 3\ interest with no allowances for arrears. 
As of December of 1985, $47.1 million remain outstanding although 
none have been traded since 1982. 
Although Bolivia remained in default for almost 30 years, it 
did receive some new capital flows after the 1930's. (see Tables 
A.3 and A. 4 . ) The U.S. Export-Import Bank extended credits of 
$15.5 million in 1942, $16 million in 1949, and $2.4 million in 
1955. In 1953, the U. S. and Bolivia struck an agreement on 
economic assistance to provide agricultural commodities and to 
promote mineral exports. In.addition, the U.S. government gave 
Bolivia grants totalling $21 million over the period 1946~54. In 
1956, the IMF provided a stand-by agreement for $7.5 million (of 
~h $4 million was drawn) and, with the u.s. government, three 
lines of credit totalling $25 million to form an exchange 
stabilization fund in return for which Bolivia adopted fiscal and 
trade policy reforms. Continued default did render Bolivia 
ineligible for IBRD developmental loans in the 1950'S even though 
it was a member of the- Bank. 
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B.3. Chile's Debt History 
Between 1922 and 1930, Chile issued dollar bonds totalling 
$297 million of which $185 million were national debt (seven 
issues at 6 to 7%), $90 million were nationally-guaranteed 
corporate debt (five issues at 6 to 6.75%), and $21 million were 
non-guaranteed municipal debt (three issues at 7%). Three of the 
national issues allowed retirement at market prices, of which two 
also allowed the government to increase sinking fund payments at 
will. The remaining four Republic issues and all five guaranteed 
issues allowed redemption only through drawings at par, although 
sinking fund paymenbts could be increased. 
Chile reacted to the initial shock of world depression as 
did Argentina by expanding government spending. However, amidst 
- -
political turmoil, its short-lived socialist government of 1931 
to 1932 eagerly increased the government budget without the 
restraint shown by Argentina. A growing fiscal def ici t only 
worsened the burden of debt servicing rose as government revenues 
continued to decline. The government concluded that it was 
necessary to suspend external debt service and imposed exchange 
restrictions to force default on non-national issues as well. 
Interest and sinking fund payments were defaulted for each 
national or nationally-guaranteed bond in turn as semi-annual 
payments came due, starting in August 1931 until January 1932, at 
which time $261 million of these dollar bonds remained 
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outstanding. The municipal issues similarly defaulted, between 
November 1931 and March of 1932 (with $20 million outstanding 
from original principal of $21 million). 
In 1934, the Foreign Bondholders' Protective council 
protested Chile's arrangements to serve its short-term 
obligations and to extend its trade commitments to the U.S., both 
of which would absorb foreign exchange, without considering 
serv icing on its defaulted long-term debt. In October of the 
same year, the government passed Law 5580, to take effect in 
January of 1935, which stipulated that revenues from the income 
tax paid by copper companies and from government profits from the 
nitrate industry would be turned over to the Amortization 
Institute which would use half as interest and half as 
amortization payments on all outstanding foreign (including non-
dollar) debt, no other funds t~ be provided for its servicing. 
This plan offered reduced coupon payments to be announced in 
ary of each year and available only to bondholders who had 
cheir bonds stamped in agreement with the provisions of the Law. 
The Law also set up provisions for a sinking fund for redemption 
of the bonds by direct purchase below par in the market or by 
drawings at par. (Nine out of the twelve national and guaranteed 
issues did not allow such purchases below par in the original 
bond contracts.) 
The government claimed that although the country's economic 
situation had improved (in terms of its capacity to pay), because 
its foreign loans had originally been granted based on 
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expectations of export revenues, it was appropriate that the 
interest of creditors be linked to the prosperity of commodities 
whose markets were strongly influenced by the policies, 
particularly trade restrictions, of the creditor countries. The 
Council recommended refusal of this plan, given that in 1934 the 
contractual payments on all foreign debt amounted to $41 million 
(of which $27 million was interest) while Law 5580 provided a 
mere $4 million for servicing (of which $2 million would be 
interest) and, in addition, to collect under the plan, the 
bondholders were required to waive the rights derived from the 
original bond contracts. 
Between April of 1936 and January of 1939, a total of 
$39.885 per $1000 bond was offered in interest payments if the 
bondholder assented to Law 5580 (by having the bonds stamped~, 
with_back interest payments available to new participants until 
January of 1940 for Republic and Republic-guaranteed issues (by 
which time 81\ of these bonds had been stamped) and until August 
of 1940 for municipal issues. All subsequent annual interest 
offers were available only during the same calendar year and 
required both assent and surrender of all previous coupons. 
Between 1935 and 1948! these partial payments amounted to about 
20' of the contracted interest. 
By 1940, the Chilean government was busily diverting 
promised funds elsewhere instead of redeeming its debts, and 
servicing became even more stringent. A December of 1940 decree 
ordered the transfer of $6 million from the Amortization 
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Institute to the Treasury for the rehabilitation of 1939 
earthquake damage (although the government apologized to 
bondholders and promised to return to the provisions of Law 5580 
in 1941.) However, in 1942, Law 7160 set an extraordinary tax on 
copper companies, thereby reducing the revenues available for 
debt service. These revenues were also reduced by diversion from 
the amortization account of some $22 million between 1941 and 
1949. Furthermore, none of the bonds repurchased under the plan 
were presented to the fiscal agent for cancellation and so 
continued to participate in the pro rata distribution of 
interest. 
Upon refusal of a $40 million loan from the IBRD in 
september of 1946, Chile rethought its servicing strategy. In 
the spring of 1947, the ~hilean government held discussions with 
the FBPC wl1ich rejected - the Chj.lean proposal of a reduction in 
principal. Then, in March of 1948, Chile presented an exchange 
~r for all its dollar bonds under Law 8962 to replace the 1935 
law's provisions. The Council commented that "the proposal was a 
recognition on the part of the Chilean authorities of the need 
for acceptable service.,,4 A new issue of 46-year dollar bonds of 
the Republic would be exchangeable at par for the presently 
outstanding bonds of the Republic, the Mortgage Bank, and the 
municipalities, consolidating them into a single loan. They 
would bear reduced interest, starting at 1.5t in 1948 and rising 
to 3t in 1954 and thereafter. Bondholders who had not assented 
4 rBPC (1949), p. 103. 
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to Law 5580 and those who assented late were to receive all 
compensation previously offered under that plan in non-interest 
bearing scrip, redeemable over a period of ten years. The offer 
was held open until December of 1970, and the Council recommended 
acceptance. By December of 1949, 77t of the outstanding bonds 
had been exchanged under this offer. More importantly, the lBRD 
approved a $16 million loan to Chile on March 25, 1948, the day 
after the announcement of this settlement. 
In 1950,' Chile terminated the allocation of revenue directly 
to the Amortization Institute, and the Treasury began to allocate 
directly the funds necessary to service foreign debt. Interest 
payments continued under the 1935 Law until 1967 for those who 
assented to that settlement but not to the 1948 Law; the 
remaining amounts outstanding' fell to zero by 1970. The 1948 New 
Bonds- were servicect faithfully' until the remaining principal was 
recalled in 1978. 
Chile also had substantial non-dollar debt during this 
period. Between 1885 and 1929, numerous bonds were issued in 
sterling and in 1929 and 1930, a small amount was borrowed in 
swiss Francs. In 1930, when Chile owed $157.9 million in long-
term dollar debt, it also owed $160.5 and $16.2 in sterling and 
Swiss Francs respectively (converted to $ at par). Default on 
non-dollar obligations occurred at the same time as on dollar 
bonds, and the subsequent settlement plans were extended to these 
issues as well. Law 5580 included all foreign debt from the 
. -st.4rt. The 1948 exchange offer was made available to sterling 
,-' 
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debt in December of that year and to Swiss Franc debt in August 
of 1949. By the end of 1949, 92\ of sterling debt and 81\ of 
Swiss Franc debt had assented to the offer. 
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B.4. Colombia's pebt History 
Between 1926 and 1928, Colombia publicly offered dollar 
bonds in the form of two national issues at 6\ for $60 million 
and four nationally-guaranteed Agricultural Mortgage Bank issues 
at 6\ and 7\ for $16 million. Between 1924 and 1929, six 
Departments and four municipalities borrowed $67.4 million at 
6.5\ to 7.5\ and $26.1 million at 6.5\ to 8\ respectively in the 
form of dollar bonds without national guarantee. Both of the 
Republic issues and three of the Mortgage Bank issues allowed 
retirement through purchases at market prices. One of the 
Republic issues also allowed the government to increase sinking 
fund payments. 
Starting in October of 1931, some of Colombia I s _ municipal 
issues began defaulting on sinking fund payments. One municipal 
issue defaulted on interest payments as well in December. By the 
end of 1932, most of the municipal and departmental issues had 
defaulted on interest and sinking fund, and the nationally-
guaranteed Agricultural Mortgage Bank issues had defaulted on 
sinking fund only. jt was not until 1933 that the Republic 
issues defaulted and the Mortgage Bank issues ceased payment on 
interest. By October of 1933, all issues were in default, at 
which time $66.1 million ot national and nationally-quaranteed 
bonds and $82 million of departmental and municipal bonds as well 
as $13.2 ot defaulted sterling debt were outstanding. 
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Reduced interest payments were made on the two national 
issues after default. In 1934, a payment of 1/3 cash and 2/3 non-
interest scrip (not redeemed for cash until 1937) was offered for 
two coupons on one bond and one coupon on the other. Two more 
coupons were paid on each in 1936 entirely in 4% scrip (redeemed 
in 1946). In 1940, the government paid half of the contractual 
interest on the two bonds for that year upon surrender of both 
coupons and turned in to the fiscal agent $6.0 million in bonds 
(about 10% of the amount outstanding at the time of default) 
purchased since 1933 at prices ranging from 16 to 27. 
In June of 1941, Decree 1388 went into effect, offering a 
settlement plan for the national issues. New 3% bonds, External 
Sinking Fund Dollar Bonds due 1970, were offered in exchange at 
par for the $43.7 outstanding national bonds with convertible 
certificates for_half of the unpaid interest arrears between ~935 
and 1939. The Foreign Bondholders Protective Council protested 
.nst the inadequacy and unfairness of this offer which was 
.Iot based on what Colombia plainly can do. It represents the 
most Colombia reluctantly has been willing to do." 5 The Council 
objected especially because the decree claimed the government's 
"right to stop payments if at any time economic or fiscal 
conditions prevent the country from promptly and completely 
servicing the new issue,,6 and because Colombia was fully 
servicing its internal and short-term obligations throughout this 
5 FBPC (1940), p. 33. 
6 FBPC (1940), p. 33. 
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period. Furthermore, the Council claimed that Colombia had 
maintained a favorable balance of trade with the U.S. all through 
the late 1930 1 s, with its export surplus exceeding ten times the 
interest requirements on its dollar bonds. The Council denounced 
a publ ished statement of the Colombian Minister of Finance in 
which he 
enunciates the policy of Colombia to be to lower the 
interest rate as much as possible in order to depress the 
value of the bonds and take advantage of the necessities of 
the bondholders who are obliged to sell their bonds at the 
low prices forced upon them by the Colombian Government 
itself. 7 
Nevertheless, "the Council does not feel justified in expecting 
that the Colombian Government will make any more favorable 
proposal to the bondholders, ,,8 and the Council was right. No 
. subsequent offer was made on the Republic issues. By 1945, 88\ 
of the national issues were reported exchanged. This offer was 
unique in becoming a final and binding settlement without the 
stamp of approval of the Council. 
In July of 1942, the same exchange bonds were offered for 
the Agricultural Mortgage Bank issues with convertible 
certificates for $100 of interest arrears (equal to about 20' of 
interest owed) and to non-quaranteed mortgage bonds from the Bank 
of Colombia, the Mortgage Bank of Bogota, and the Mortgage Bank 
of Colombia for 75' of their face amount only, with past interest 
cancelled. Since no additional new bonds had been authorized, 
7 FBPC (1940), p. 33. 
8 FBPC (1940), p. 33. 
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exchanges were made with new 3\ bonds redeemed since 1941 by 
Colombia. At this time, it was revealed that approximately 50\ 
of all the mortgage bonds had been repatriated but not returned 
to the fiscal agent for cancellation between 1933 and 1942 when 
market quotations ranged from 14 to 38. 
In November of 1944, the same offer was extended to City of 
Bogota bonds, again with all past interest cancelled, at which 
time it was reported that 60\ of these bonds had been bought back 
during defaul·t. In addition, one other municipal issue reached 
its own settlement in 1944. The other two cities and all 
departments continued in default until 1949 when new 3\ bonds of 
the same obligors, guaranteed by the Republic, were offered in 
exchange for 120\ of the principal amount outstanding, in 
compromise of all interest arrears since 1932.- This offer 
received the recommendation of the Council. Almost 50\ ~ these 
issues had been repurchased on the open market after default. By 
, 77\ of the bonds had been exchanged. 
Colombia had a smaller amount of sterling debt on which it 
defaulted at the same time as on its dollar bonds. Five national 
sterling bonds issued between 1906 and 1920 totalling $12.9 
million in principal ~nd one Agricultural Mortgage Bank issue of 
1929 for $.6 million constit¥ted all of Colombia t s non-dollar 
long-term debt until the 1933 and 1934 issue of $6 million in 
Funding Certificates (similar to the 1934 scrip issued in 
dollars). Service was resumed in July of 1942 along the same 
lines as the plan for dollar bonds but with no exchange for new 
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bonds. Half of interest arrears was paid in 3' scrip while 
current and future interest was to be paid at half the originally 
contracted rate. 
Colombia fared moderately well in the 1950' s in terms of 
external finance. (See Tables A.7 and A.8.) It received IBRD 
loans totalling $36 million between 1949 and 1954 to finance road 
and railway construction and hydroelectric works. Between 1955 
and 1960, IBRD extended the country $75 million more. It also 
received $53 million between 1946 and 1954 from the Export-Import 
Bank (and from U. S. commercial banks guaranteed by the Export-
Import Bank and the Colombian government). Between 1955 and 
1960, Colombia received an additional $142 million to refinance 
arrears on import payments of private importers and commercial 
banks. Colombia did not undergo any reschedulings in the 1950 r s 
or early i960's, its debt havlng a relatively low proportion of 
supplier credits to total, leaving it more manageable than that 
of other Latin American states. 
B.S. Peru's Debt History 
Peru issued 94.S-million of dollar bonds in 1927 and 1928. 
Of these, $90 million were three national issues at 6t and 7t 
while the remaining amount consisted of $1.5 million borrowed by 
the Province of Callao at 7.St with the guarantee of the national 
government and $6.5 million borrowed by the city of Lima at 6.St • 
.. T~ Republic issues allowed redemptions only through drawings at 
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par or 105. The provincial issue allowed retirement through 
purchases at market prices. 
Peru defaulted on its dollar obligations between April of 
1931 and March of 1932 at which time $91 million of principal 
remained outstanding. Funds remaining with the fiscal agent 
allowed partial payments (of .5% to 3.25%) on account of one 
additional coupon in 1932 for the national and provincial issues. 
In 1937, small payments of .5%, less than 10% of the interest due 
for that year, were offered by Peru on its national issues if the 
next two coupons were surrendered. The Foreign Bondholders 
Protective Council suggested that approximately two-thirds of 
bondholders accepted this payment. The Council obj ected that 
this small sum amounted to less than 1.5% of the Peruvian 
government's budget for 1936. 
in 1940, Peru adjusted a short-term dollar banking credit, 
payinq up its interest arrears and arranging future payments at a 
~oouced from 6% to 2% and also continued paying interest on 
'. 
~ne only foreign debt on which it never defaulted, the Sterling 
Guano.~If>an, at 4% instead of the contracted 7.5%; however, it 
attempted no action on its dollar bond obligations. In 1941, the 
existing Peruvian Bon4holders Committee for the national issues 
threw in ~~o towel, and the Foreign Bondholders Protective 
Cou~;l took over responsibility for negotiations. 
Until 1945, Peru's only offer of settlement was on what was 
described as 'the Mexican basis', at one sol to the dollar, which 
would have resulted in a reduction of principal by approximately 
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85t. In 1945, the Peruvian Congress considered a bill proposing 
redemption of service on the external dollar debt by providing 
for interest from 1945 to be paid at 1', rising to 3' by 1950, 
and for a sinking fund of .5\ per annum. The interest arrears of 
the 15 years of default up to August 1945 were to be cancelled. 
This bill was never passed. 
In February of 1947, the Peruvian Congress passed Law 10832, 
authorizing the government to resume service on the defaulted 
dollar and sterl ing loans on terms less generous than those 
considered in 1945. The Law provided that interest up to 
December of 1946 was to be cancelled. New exchange bonds were to 
be issued due 1997, Series A through 0, corresponding to old 
issues of the Republic and of Callao. Series E dollar bonds were 
provided to cover two sterling issues. Interest would then be 
paid- at 1\ for 19-47 and 1948 and a_t 2.5% -thereafter. Sinking 
fund payments would be .5' per annum of the total amount issued, 
to purchase bonds below par in the market or to draw bonds at 
par. In addition, the city of Lima was empowered "to resume 
service on its foreign debt in the manner that it may deem 
convenient." (FBPC, 1949, p. 314). The Council recommended 
refusal of this pl~ because it called for the complete 
cancellation of interest arrears over 15 to 16 years, amounting 
to 90\ to over 100\ of the remaining principal outstanding on the 
issues, because "the ultimate interest rate of 2.5' is lower that 
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the Council has ever agreed to recommend for foreign national 
bonds,n9 and because 
this legislation does not purport to authorize an 
offer, subject to acceptance by bondholders (as is 
customary and necessary in bond adjustments) but to be 
a unilateral change made by Peru in its contracts with 
all bondholders, with or without their consent. 10 
Furthermore, the Council considered the service obligation to be 
unacceptably low as a proportion of the government budget or of 
exports. Nevertheless, by 1951, 64% of the bonds had assented. 
In November of 1951, following negotiations with the 
Council, a new readjustment plan was announced, with the 
Council's recommendation for acceptance. This offer was to take 
effect in January of 1953, providing another set of exchange 
bonds with conditions similar to those of the 1947 bonds, with a 
maturity of 1997 ~ut paying intere~t of 3\ from 1953 as well as 
offering non-interest bearing scrip· f~r 10\ of the unpaid 
interest arrears of 1931 to 1946 (to be paid off over 15 years). 
Both those bondholders who had accepted the 1947 exchange and 
those who had not were entitled to participate. All coupon 
payments made under the 1947 offer would be paid in a lump sum to 
those who had refused the 1947 offer upon acceptance of the new 
exchange. The new plan also included a new Series L bond issue 
in exchange for Lima's defaulted dollar bonds. The offer was 
originally to terminate in 1954 but was extended four times to a 
final termination date of 1970. It was not extended to cover the 
9 FBPC (1949), P. 316. 
10 FBPC (1949), p. 314. 
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series E bonds (for the old sterling loans) until 1954. By 1957, 
95% of the bonds had assented. 
Peru I s non-dollar borrowings were small by comparison. It 
had two national sterling issues for $6.3 million in 1922 and 
$10.0 million in 1928 and one municipal issue by Lima for $.6 
million in 1911. The 1928 sterling loan and the Lima loan 
defaulted at the same time as the dollar bonds; however, reduced 
service (at 4\ rather than 7.5\) on the Sterling Guano Loan of 
1922 was maintained until redemption in 1960. In 1947, the 
bondholders of the two defaulted issues were offered Series E 
dollar bonds under Law 10832, and in 1954, new Series E bonds 
were offered with the improved service discussed above. All 1947 
series E bonds were exchanged by 1961. 
Further external financial flows are recorded in Tables A.9 
and A.10. Peru received a number of loans from the u.~. Export-
Import Bank, including $.5 million in 1945 and then $16 million 
more between 1950 and 1955 to private Peruvian companies, 
especially mining companies. Between 1955 and 1960, it provided 
$149 million more of which $100 million was granted to a Peruvian 
copper company to develop mines in the south of the country and 
the rest to finance various imports. lBRD has also extended 
loans. Between 1952 and 1954, it provided $3 million for port 
improvement and agricultural equipment imports and $39 million 
between 1955 and 1960. Finally, the U.S. gave an additional $11 
million to Peru in this period as bilateral aid. 
66 
Appendix c. Notes on Methodology 
These notes explain the specific definitions and assumptions 
used in the cost of borrowing calculations and include a list of 
additional data sources. 
The cost of borrowing was calculated in terms of present 
values of borrowings, of payments, and of net payments on all of 
each country I s national and nationally-guaranteed dollar bonds 
issued from 1917 onwards, each issue being tracked from the date 
of issue until redemption (or 1980). Each bond I s stream of 
actual receipts and actual payments, including interest and 
amortization and other buyback payments, was converted into 
comparable present value by discounting to the issue year for 
each bond and then to the common base year of 1920, using the 
yield to maturity on u.s. long government bonds for the year of 
issue and for 1920. country totals are the sum of the net 
present values for all its issues. 
Net present values include principal received as negative 
payment amounts and are calculated for each country as follows: 
NPV -
-(tOb-1920 ) 
* (1 + r1920) 
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where Vtb = payments in year t net of new principal for bond b; 
rOb -u.s. interest rate in issue year of bond b; 
tOb - issue year of bond b; 
r1920 = u.s. interest rate in 1920; 
b = bond issue. 
Principal received is estimated as the issue amount of the 
bond valued at the issue price in the market minus the bankers' 
spread for that country for that year. Principal amount and 
issue prices are from D & D (1937). Bankers' spreads by year and 
country are from Lewis (1938) or by country averaged over the 
period from Madden (1937). 
Interest payments for year t for each bond are calculated as 
the contractual interest rate on all bonds outstanding at the end 
of the previous year. If bonds must be stamped to receive 
interest under a settlement plan, then the annual· payment is 
calculated on the amount of stamped bonds outstanding. If 
interest was paid in scrip, the amount is recorded for the year 
in which it became payable in cash. 
Outstanding bonds indicates the end-of-year value for bonds 
still outstanding in the hands of the public, generally as 
reported by the fiscal- agent for the issue. Amounts are from UNPD 
tor 1912-21 and from various volumes at 0 , 0 for 1924-32, of 
FBPC for 1934-57,61,64,67, and from MBR for 1970-80. Missing 
years are extrapolated to lie on the trend between the existing 
data points. 
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Reductions in amounts of principal outstanding (amortization 
payments) are valued as follows. If the redemption is recorded, 
then the amount called is valued at par (unless otherwise 
specified in the bond contract). If official redemptions did not 
occur, then it is assumed that all retirement of bonds occurred 
through purchases at market price after default and in accordance 
with the provisions of the original bond contract before default. 
Buybacks that occurred during the period of default did not get 
reported to either the Foreign Bondholders Protective Councilor 
the fiscal agent until some offer of settlement was made. These 
buybacks are assumed to have taken place at an even rate during 
these periods of non-reporting. It should be noted that all of 
the post-default settlement plans allowed for buybacks at less 
than par as did 12 out of 36 of the original bond agreements. 
Market prices ~nd dates of redemptions a~e frofu various volumes 
of FBB for 1923-33, of D , D for 1924-32, of FBPC for 1933-44, of 
B , QR for 1945-59,71-80, and of S , P for 1960-70. 
Descriptions of the original bond contracts and the nature 
and timing of defaults are from D , D and FBPC. The details of 
settlement plans are from FSPC, including partial interest 
payments or payments via scrip during default, amounts stamped in 
assent, and estimates of buybacks on the market below par. 
United States interest rates are recorded in Table A.12 and 
are from BMS and FRB. 
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